The ANC's Two-state South African State: ANC-capitalism as a Specific Capitalist World-ecology in the South African Web of Life. Part II

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'Every new generation has to become civilized again.'

(Max Horkheimer, 13 March 1956,
in Adorno and Horkheimer 2001: 47.)

Abstract

World-ecology thinking is useful in attempts to understand systemic fraudulent ANC-capitalist governance through internal colonisation. The ANC has been stripped from its myth of being the champion for *all* South Africans *and* for a *better* life. The relative disposition to populist politics, e.g. Economic Freedom Fighters, has compromised its once alleged moral high-ground. Internal contradictions under the rhetoric of ethical and moral claims on behalf of the citizenry have impoverished the poor more so than others in society. This has resulted in looting of centres of accumulated monopoly capital by governing executives at *all* levels of governing. The phenomenon of plunder dates back to before the end of apartheid, and is nothing less than *crimes against the South African humanity*. For such, the ANC is on trial.

Key words: Apartheid-capitalism, ANC-capitalism, ANC's two-state South African state, capital as world-ecology, centres of surplus capital accumulation, corruption, internal colonisation, state capture, web of life.

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1. Introduction

Theorizing about capital accumulation is fundamental to approaches about world histories (Moore 2015: x) because different approaches have all been imbedded in capital in one *form* or another although to varying *degrees*.

This article is an apprehensive acceptance of an invitation extended by Professor Jason W. Moore to take part in open global conversation about a number of pressing issues that confront the world today: 'humanity's place in nature'; how our contemplating thereof 'shapes our view of history'; what our 'analysis of the present crises' is, and 'the politics of liberation for *all* life' (Moore 2015: ix). These four pronouncements taken together are, for the intentions herein, regarded as Moore's *praxis.*

Stated more simply, the objective of this article is to determine the relevance of Moore's *praxis* about *capital as world-ecology* for analysing contemporary *ANC-capitalism* as a specific ecology in the everyday 'web of life' in early 21st century South Africa.

In fairness to Moore, it would be impossible to do justice to all his thinking in an undertaking of this limited scope. For practical reasons, the efforts herein are confined to Moore's *Capitalism in the Web of Life. Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital* (2015) and Moore (ed.) *Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism* (2016). As a result the focus is only on a selection of Moore's key conceptualizations.

The next section attends to some concepts and ideas employed herein in their relation to an understanding of the African National Congress' capitalist web of life. Section four builds on the theme of how the ANC is on trial for governing its fraudulent organs of state. The conclusion ties loose ends together.

2. Ideas in concepts, concepts in ideas

In developing and formulating his concept of world-ecology some 15 years ago, Moore (2003: 447) suggested that it is:

> 'not the interaction of a world-economy in one box and a world-ecology in the other but rather a conception of capitalism in which economy and ecology are increasingly unthinkable without each other.'

World-ecology is

> 'not the ecology of the world' […] 'but the ecology of the *oikeios*: that creative, generative, and multi-layered relation of life-making, of species and

> environments. Species make environments; environments make species' (Moore 2016: 87. Emphasis in original).

For Moore the web of life is 'nature as a whole that includes humans', in other words: 'everything that's humans do is *already* joined with extra-human nature *and* the web of life' (Moore 20015: 5). Moore (2017: 179) continues that:

> 'The Capitalocene is a way to begin to ask how the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power and the co-production of nature form an organic whole. *That whole is a "world-ecology*."' (Emphasis added).

And how are these joined? The answer: through Moore's principle of double-internality – e.g. 'species make environments, and environments make species' (Moore 2015: 7).

At the centre of the web of life is the *oikeios* or 'favourable place' (Moore 2015: 35). *Oikeios* names 'the creative, historical, and dialectical relation between, and also always within, human and extra-human natures' (Moore 2015: 35) where *relations* is a matrix, in other words they are a multi-layered dialectic (Moore 2015: 36) that comprises e.g. 'flora and fauna, but also our planet's manifold geological and biospheric configurations…' (Moore 2015: 36).

Through the o*ikeios* (the multi-layered dialectic and favourable place) the relations and conditions that create but also destroy humanity's co-operation and conflicts, are formed and re-formed. Combined they, represent 'social organisation'. So, to restate Moore: the *oikeios* does not do something *to* or *with* nature, rather, the relations they create, develop through nature-as-multi-layered-dialectic-matrix.

These relations are 'the dominant "bundles" of human and extra-human nature [which are] the choices of civilizations' (Moore 2015: 293) as they reveal themselves in e.g. class and power. All bundles are specific power configurations in the web of life (Moore 2015: 37). In contemporary South Africa, corruption is one such 'bundle' perpetrated by ANC-capitalism as world-ecology in current history of the country. In so-doing, ANC-capitalism and corruption *praxes* are ways of organising every-day civic society through the *oikeios* in the web of life.

But the *oikeios* goes further than for example an 'environmental' aspect of human activity – *it is a world-ecology* – a framework for theorizing about the strategic relations (they are social human relations) that are central to capitalist civilization. But capitalist civilization, that is, history of a specific kind, is not the result of an outcome: it is the producer/product-relation/s in the web of life. Viewed in this manner, historical nature is not a place or an object. Instead, it is nature-as-matrix – 'the field within which capitalism unfolds' (Moore 2015: 42–44). In this way, through *oikeios* a wide range of meta-processes are named – processes of *social* relations of the web of life.

In the opening page of *Capitalism in the Web of Life*, Moore (2015: 1) made it clear that the future for the 21st century looks bleak and that 'neoliberal capitalism' faces 'an inevitable […] terminal crisis'. Then, on the last page Moore (2015: 305) asks how long can capital's crises last? When posing these two questions, Moore is not only about existential gloom. Between these two extremes (of a bleak human future and capitalism in terminal crisis on the one hand, but wondering when this terminal crisis will end, on the other), lies one of the levels of abstraction that Moore developed – namely, that of 'humanity-in-nature'. As for how long capitalism will last, is a matter for another discussion, but for now, the following provisional and cryptic observations will suffice.

Nature is finite whilst capital is imbedded in the premise that it is infinite (Moore 2015: 87). Therefore for Moore (2015: 87) 'capitalism's metabolism is inherently an open-flow system that continually exhausts its sources of nourishment'. The difference that opens is a result of this endless accumulation at the expense of the frontiers of appropriation. This is because capital extracts more than it replaces. And there 'are limits to how much new work capitalism can squeeze out of the new working class, forests, aquifers, oilfields, coal streams, and everything else' (Moore 2017: 87). As a result capital faces at some point the reality of diminishing returns being unable to settle its ecological debt. Thus: when frontiers eventually close because there is nothing left to extract, thus reducing the capacity of existing and future capital (Moore 2015: 276), that brings an end to Cheap Nature and with it so ends capitalism's free ride (Moore 2015: 87). But when will this end be? That answer depends on how one approaches the following two questions: firstly, can capitalism survive the present climate crisis? And secondly, what conditions have capitalism put in place to secure its growth and accumulation? (Moore 2015: 178). Nevertheless, Moore's vision for *longue durée* optimism is imbedded in the belief of the 'start of something better' (Moore 2015: 295) in 'the century ahead' (Moore 2015 194) as '[c]apitalism will give way to another model—or models—over the next century' (Moore 2015: 294). Certainly, for Moore (2018: 191) there are also encouraging stories of conversation, care and cultivation of 'new ecologies of hope and justice in the 21st century'.

Moore (2015: 30) points to 'an understanding of modernity's historically specific natures as *webs of liberation*' (emphasis added). Moore's optimism (although not unqualified) is exactly this: 'Nature can be neither destroyed or saved, only reconfigured in ways that are more or less emancipatory, more or less oppressive' (Moore 2015: 48). The implication is that [e]mancipation or oppression not from the standpoint of humanity *and* nature but from the perspective of humanity-*in*-nature … and nature-in-humanity' (Moore 2015: 49. Emphasis in original). This underpins Moore's urgency to ask 'new questions about the relationship between environmental change and whose work is valued...' (Moore 2016: 78).

Although Moore (2015: 11) has 'little patience with grand theory' his concept of world-ecology nevertheless serves as 'a *framework* for theorizing' (Moore 2015: 42. Emphasis added) to 'developing effective analysis and emancipatory politics as modernity unravels in the century ahead' (Moore 2015: 194). This means that new questions about the drivers of global disasters move away '*from*

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consequences of environment-making *to* its *conditions and causes'* (Moore 2016: 78. Emphasis added) – *away* from being reactive *towards* being pro-active because it moves from 'the present to the future' in order 'to remake our place in nature in a way that promises emancipation for all life' (Moore 2016: 114). How or what has this got anything to do with ANC's two-state capitalist *praxis* in the South African state?

Despite all the limitations listed above, Moore's insights are highly relevant for understanding today's ANC-*capitalism.* Since all written works are always incomplete and intended to have an effect on its readers, this article is no different. There are, also, two things that this article is not: it is *not* an anti-government debate and *not* even an anti-ANC statement.

One world history amongst other ecologies is that of *capital as world-ecology* (Moore 2015; Moore 2016). Capitalism is, after all, the longest standing modern exchange system but now in crises – that is, if one sides with likeminded analysts. Similarly, the ANC boasts Africa's oldest liberation movement (Basson 2012: 2) that dates back to January 1912 in Bloemfontein when the organisation was initially founded as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) but later renamed in 1923 to African National Congress. By all accounts, and not unlike capital, the ruling party in South Africa is now also in crisis. Subjective as this statement might be, it has been expressed by many party leaders and supporters. Current revelations in the Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture, confirms this. Deputy President Mabuza said on Sunday 18 November 2018 that 'the party could not ignore the allegations [of corruption] levelled against it and that he is ready ''to do anything for the ANC to *survive*...' (Madia 2018. Emphasis added). A final observation will suffice. Basson (2018) wrote:

> 'Courtesy of President Cyril Ramaphosa, the Bosasa state capture scandal is topping the national agenda. 12 Years after I first started to investigate Bosasa and its CEO Gavin Watson, a R500 000 donation to Ramaphosa's Nasrec campaign trust has blown open the ANC's complicated, conflicted and downright corrupt relationship with tender-rich companies like Bosasa.'

Moore (2015: 12, 16, 58, 182, 189, 201–217) traced the origins of capitalism back to the 'long' sixteenth century (*c*.1451–1648). One of the advantages of Moore's thinking, is that the 'long' sixteenth century spans the same time when Dutch and Portuguese explorers pushed their maritime efforts (also) around the southern tip of Africa *en route* to the East (Austen 1987; Braudel 1987; Braudel 1995; Davidson 1991; de Villiers in Pretorius 2014: 41–43; Elphick and Giliomee 1980; Mostert 1992: 7–39; Muller 1986: 1–17; Theal 1890: 1–12; Thompson 2007: xiv; Vernon 2013; Walker 1959: 1–23; Welsh 2000: 1–39; Wilson and Thompson 1969, I: 78–86). Together with this 'overlap and entanglement between maritime and land histories' (Ghervas in Armitage *et al*. 2018: 236) this was also a period that resulted in European 'colonising efforts from the sea'.

When capitalism's antithesis, the Soviet system, finally collapsed, first the Berlin Wall in 1989, and then the Soviet Union in 1992, most Marxists turned to new intellectual endeavours. 'No one had anticipated that communism would make such a rapid and undignified exit from history' (Stedman Jones in Marx 2002: 4). Many moved closer to capital – including some ANC intellectuals. In relation to this, Professor Martin C. Legassick (2007: 440) wrote:

> 'The negotiated settlement [at CODESA] drew the ANC, in government, into a compromise with capitalism. Since 1994, the ANC government has promoted the capitalist economy. "There is no other way", the ideologists of the ANC proclaimed when they introduced GEAR [Growth, Employment and Redistribution] in 1996 […] But GEAR has been a vicious neo-liberal economic programme […] attacking the living standards of the working class.'

As the unevenly developed global neo-liberal capitalism's contemporary crises continue to expose itself for more than 40 years, we are today not only experiencing the transition of one form of capitalism to another in South Africa – that is, *from* apartheid-capitalism *to* ANC-capitalism – and we experience something more fundamental. Moore (2015: 1) attributed this world-wide acute change of capital to 'the breakdown of the strategies and relations that have sustained capital accumulation' over many centuries. Naturally, events in South Africa take place in the web of life of an interconnected global capitalist world-ecology. There is no simplistic change from apartheid-capitalism to ANC-capitalism in South Africa. Rather, it causes those who suffer from the development of capitalist production as a result of the 'incomplete development' thereof (Marx 1983: 20). The argument herein is that this is also true of post-apartheid ANC-capitalism and the unethical and immoral ANC-*praxis* brought about no better life for all South Africans. Many observers have reported in the now famous phrase, 'that the ANC and the South African government lost its moral compass' (Feinstein in Holden 2008; vii) and in the lyrics of U2, the ANC 'still haven't found what [they're] looking for'.

For Moore then, the current change in capitalism is *epochal* in scope *and* a *metabolic shift* (Moore 2015: 15) in intensity (emphasis in original). The current changes in relationship between the ANC-state and ANC-capitalism go to the roots of unethical and immoral *relationships with* monopoly capital, *and amongst* the ANC's ruling elite practice and perpetuates such. The ANC's new ruling elite is fraught with fraud and corruption. There is no benefit in debating ANC denialist rhetoric. Its members are everywhere on trial. In the words of Marx (1983: 21), perpetrators of fraud and corruption 'are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests'.

Today's importance – if one accepts Moore's invitation and the elements thereof, for the purposes of analysing ANC *praxis* – is that the South African electorate will pronounce in the next general

elections (of 2019) on the scope *and* nature of the ANC's behavioural change relative to the *illegal appropriation of monopoly capital* from *centres of monopoly accumulation*, on the one hand, but on the other, about continued ANC *neo-struggle* politics of hope for a better life – something that the ANC has now been peddling for more than a century and incapable of delivering.

The reality for the ANC *struggle* is that when Zuma was exposed, *the party went on trial*. It is reasonably impossible for party members not to have known that large-scale fraud and corruption is practiced. This is because of the seamless relationship between Zuma and the party. Basson (2012: 6) wrote that the ANC has been 'acutely aware of Zuma's flaws' but

> 'he ran ANC intelligence from the mid-1980s. "He knows everything about the party. He knows everybody's dirt. A lot of people cannot afford for Zuma to start speaking…"' (Basson 2012: 6).

Furthermore, as the members of the Zondo commission about state capture listened to Gordhan's testimony,

> 'Zondo […] regularly referenced the role of the ANC' but, 'where were they during state capture?', '[w]hen did it realise there was something wrong? When did they realise state capture was occurring? And what did they do about it?'' he asked deputy chief justice Zondo' (Du Toit 2018b).

Secondly, 'within the culture of the African National Congress (ANC) it is implicitly accepted that one does not talk publically about what happens inside the organisation. Especially if what is happening is controversial or at odds with the party line' (Feinstein 2007: xi). Of course, the history of such secrecy boiled over in the Zondo commission.

Once the party leaders' involvement in fraud and corruption became public, it showed the way of its own future – to follow Marx – 'it creates a world after its own image' (Marx 2002: 224): Affirmative Action for the lower classes but Black Economic Empowerment for the ANC's capitalist elite. That image is imbedded in '[c]apital [as] a social power' (Marx 2002: 237). The history of Zuma's rise to power reveals that by the time he took over as president in May 2009, he could account for nothing accept for a corruption trial (Basson 2012: 1). For Zuma and the party, this happened more than decades ago and the unfortunate legacy will continue to last as long as recorded historical memory prevails. Du Toit (2018b) wrote in the same vain:

> 'Gordhan's testimony […] wasn't about the Gupta's or Tom Moyane, Berning Ntlemeza or Mosebenzi Zwane. It was about how Zuma repurposed

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> the state and the ANC, and how he shaped them into his own image: deceptive, dishonest and devious'.

Interesting and important as it might be the ANC's recent *neo-struggle* with and within itself for at least over the last two decades, is not the focus of this paper. Instead, the focus remains on the compromised ANC's-capitalism as a specific ecology in the web of life.

3. Everything happens in a context

The ANC's myth of 'a better future for *all* South Africans' has become public. It predates the end of apartheid and numerous high-ranking ANC officials such as Pikoli (2013) and Kasrils (2017) have testified to this.

The semantic confusion and false narrative in the ANC of regularly talking about 'for *all* South Africans' but just as frequently about 'of/for all *our* people', led the Congress of the People (COPE) leader Mosiuoa Lekota to ask president Cyril Ramaphosa in parliament in February 2018: 'Who is not our people in this country?' (Herman 2018). Similarly, eight months later, on 24 October 2018, new finance minister Tito Mboweni in his maiden mid-term budget policy statement in parliament, looked directly at President Ramaphosa at a particular point in his speech and made the following observation unambiguously clear: 'We must stop talking in contradictory terms' (CNBC Africa 2018).

One popular and misleading ANC perpetuated contradictory myth, is that of '*white* monopoly capital'. This habitual rhetoric is an insult to *all* population groups in the country and the present president wants to get rid of this phrase. Such is of course impossible. The second reason for contradictory language is because of the ideological differences that exist between neo-liberal capital *praxis*, communist aspirations and socialist ideals of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu respectively.

The culture of internal contradictions in the ANC and amongst its alliance partners is because the ANC's own 'systematic colonisation' (Marx 1983: 716–724) of South Africa and the development of a particular type of *ANC-capitalism, has by 2018 reached its highest stage of development in the form of state capture*. Wolpe (1975: 106) wrote:

> 'In the theory of internal colonialism, the colonial relation appears to be characterises by two main elements. Firstly, the colonial relationship is conceived of as occurring between different countries, total populations, nation, geographical areas of between peoples of different races, colours and cultures. […] Secondly, the colonial relationship is characterised, in a general way, as involving domination, oppression and exploitation […] It is these two features which constitute the core of internal colonialism'.

Today internal colonisation goes further than traditional wisdom of structured political and economic uneven development between different regions in a state. It usually refers to the exploitation of minority groups. South African historian Herman Giliomee (2016: 224) wrote:

> 'After 1994 the ANC soon instituted a form of majority domination complete with "demographic representivity" that left little room for minorities.'

The advancement of ANC-capitalism is seen as a process of internal colonization through systematic long-term and large-scale fraud and corruption. ANC-induced and institutionalised self-enrichment at the socio-economic disadvantage of *all* South Africans, have made the majority of *all* people in the country poorer, unfree since there can be no freedom in an impoverished life and disillusioned with a 'democratic' state that cannot deliver on behalf of *all people* of the country. Sooliman (2014) wrote in this regard that the

> 'only real benefit that has accrued to the majority of South Africans post-1994 is political freedom. Economic power and control of South African's vast resources is still vested with the privileged class that benefitted from apartheid. In the regards, does South Africa's "democracy" really mean anything?'

But political freedom has led to socio-economic exploitation of *all* South Africans. It is the outflow of abuse of executive power. The self-serving responses of the mainstream ANC elite, reveals the depth of its bias towards the middle-class rather than bringing together the citizenry in broadening the spoils of freedom. This disillusionment with democracy is also reflected in the anti-everything politics of the EFF. Gerber (2018) wrote:

> 'History has shown that people who follow these tactics don't really care for the people they purport to represent, and ideology is merely a tool to mobilise their base. These types don't want a better society, they want power.'

In addition, ANC 'governance' is unsustainable because of its unethical foundations. It allows and perpetuates expropriation without compensation of state resources of the country over a period of two-and-a-half decades and has effectively 'nationalised' or, stated differently, expropriated without compensation centres of capital accumulation that are supposed to benefit the entire population's economy and democratic everyday life.

The history of the ANC shows that it cannot function without the legacy of internal colonisation and its own practices thereof; ANC-capitalism; centres of surplus capital accumulation, and cannot work with monopoly capital. The VBS Mutual Bank's demise is a telling example of failed black entrepreneurship – and by all accounts, an embarrassment for *all* South Africans and for the whole world to see. What has become clear is that cohorts across the political spectrum are involved. For fraudulent self-gain, political adversaries benefitted and in some respects are now working together to push back further investigations into the bank's fraudulent business activities. The added cynicism as how to deal with the problem creates a moral dilemma about how lack of political will to deal with the problem, democratise corruption because if the Steinhoff case is not dealt with, VBS scandal cannot be given different treatment (Mathekga 2018).

This problem has been exacerbated for the president, who allegedly knew about looting of VBS bank, and about the South African Reserve Bank that dragged its feet before intervening. Firstly, the ANC has admitted and agreed to pay back 'any amount that it's found to have benefitted from the VBS Bank heist' (Phakgadi 2018). In the second instance, the SACP that advocates its championing corrupt and fraud-free politics, has benefitted from VBS bank looting when a

> 'former senior executive […] has revealed that a branch manager was ordered to make a R3 million payment to fund the national congress held by the […] SACP last year, allegedly in exchange for the party's silence on the bank's relationship with the controversial Gupta family' (Modjadji 2018).

Moore (2003: 435) wrote that in the Middle Ages '[the] states wielded territorial power, and the city-states wielded economic power, and neither could get very far without the other.' Today's SOEs in South Africa resemble the same analogy. One example of the relationship between ANC-capitalism and centres of surplus capital accumulation – or, the view that the ANC state cannot exist without monopoly capital – is unwittingly underlined by the words of Ramaphosa on 26 October 2018:

> '"The investment strike by business is over!" Thunderous applause greets this announcement by President Cyril Ramaphosa as he finally got lift-off for his administration with the commitment of R290bn into the South African economy, most of it over the next five to 10 years' (Khumalo and Haffajee 2018).

This statement is a presidential swipe at *white* monopoly capital, a wrap across the fingers about persistent historical imbalances, and the practice of typical ANC blame rhetoric. A close reading of Moore (2017: 179) offers a way out: 'The Capitalocene is not about blame; it's about identifying the

system that has devastated life on this planet'. Similarly, the country has been devastated by kleptocrats looting the frontiers.

The times during the struggle period when all opposition forces in the country fought National Party rule and when their representatives travelled the world to ask monopoly capitalists to donate funds to the ANC's *struggl*e cause, have now been reversed in only 25 years. This time, the *government* travels the world *again* asking for monopoly capital – but only this time, the purpose is to fill the state coffers which the governing elite looted. As a result, the ANC is on trial and its most recent history of 25 years, cannot be deleted, cut, pasted or archived where it cannot be seen. The reality is that during the last 15 years dozens of publications contributed to a historiography that is now starting to balance ANC history (Engelbrecht 2018b: 15). But neither side of the story can be undone.

The fact that the ANC post-1994 governing *neo*-bourgeoisie has looted the centres of monopoly capital for self-enrichment through abuse of their executive political power and privilege, has become public fact and is clear from at least three investigations: from former public protector Thuli Madonsela's 'State of Capture Report'; parliament's portfolio committees' inquiries, and the Zondo commission's current inquiry into state capture. Of course, there are many other sources. The result is that the socio-economically most vulnerable citizens in society, are worst hit – they argue that they have not attained freedom as the ANC promised they would – now holding the ANC to account for not fulfilling its constitutional and democratic obligations – in fact, the ANC has compromised both, the argument goes.

It is from this compromised position that *a long history of ANC's double-speak gives rise to policy uncertainties and coherent political strategy amongst the very same monopoly capitalists whom they looted but for whom they now (again) seek investment capital.* Business people need stable investment environments and policy clarity, but more importantly, policy *certainty*, is necessary and minimum preconditions for continued investment. This economic reality has been explained by the rating agencies (e.g. Standards and Poor's Financial Services, Moody's Investor Service and Fitch Group) on many occasions. In this regard Melanie Verwoerd (2018) lists five age-old reasons for non-investing: unemployment and flexibility of the labour market; reform of the SOEs; need for continued crackdown on corruption; reinforcement of the central bank and judiciary, and sound fiscal policy. ANC policy uncertainty and double speak are not mutually exclusive from governing through personality rather than through policy (Gevisser 2007: xxv). This is a common Africa reality but still an under-researched field of study.

The ANC's double speak – keeping Mboweni's above advice to Ramaphosa in mind – stems from a number of reasons. Firstly, in a party characterised by 'fractious factions' (Mkhabela 2018) practically every executive in government has something to say in the media. It is as if the members of the political elite have an insatiable desire to appear on TV. Secondly, these kleptocrats are ideologically and factionally divided networks with no coherent story to tell, neither can they under

such circumstances. Thirdly, the ANC's confederation of 'alliance partners' are 'allied' and 'partners' only depending on the issues at stake, or who the audience is. The relative disposition of the EFF is a case in point, effectively being the ANC's third 'alliance partner' yet being anti-everything. The history of this process reveals the EFF's leadership that has become known for a brand of dirty politics. However, it has lost its grip on being the champion of land expropriation without compensation; is linked to the VBS banking scandal, and practice inflammatory racial rhetoric (Du Toit 2018). Two more issues are at stake for the EFF and ANC: will the former loose voter support as a result of its involvement in the VBS Bank heist? And what will the outcome be of its persistent attacks on Pravin Gordhan? (Joubert 2018: 7). Aspects of its political behaviour resembles as if they have discovered the New Left but only 50 years late. According to Ralf Mathekga: 'The EFF is anti-establishment, anti-system and anti-everything. For them it is the politics of disruption' (Du Toit 2018). This is best seen in parliament when the 'politics of shout down' is at 'work'.

In addition, the ANC's distinction between *all* people and *our* people; its distinction between *WMC* and *monopoly capital;* its inability to distinguish between 'time to eat' rather than 'having time to serve', leads to and stems from, systemic fraud and corruption. Lastly, the ANC's eclipse of reason (to borrow from Horkheimer 2004); lack of understanding of its role in an enlightened democracy, and specifically its fraudulent and corrupt practices,

> *'have been termed crimes against the South African humanity* – and that should be treated as such by the international justice system' (Engelbrecht 2013; Engelbrecht 2016; and Engelbrecht 2018b: 18. Emphasis in original.)

But concepts such as systematic colonisation; ANC-capitalism; illegal appropriation of monopoly centres of surplus accumulation; and a two-state South African state, imply space and frontiers. In traditional theory, these are 'created'. They are then drawn across spheres of interest, if one accepts traditional theory.

The importance of frontiers in South African current history, gains new meaning in the light of Moore's thinking, hence a few observations later about the early frontier history in South Africa are needed before attention shifts to Moore's conceptualisations of frontiers. For this purposes, I borrow the concept of 'frontiers of appropriation of sufficiently mass' from Moore (2015: 115) and name them centres of surplus accumulation, or 'dots' in Gordhan's words, between which kleptocrats move to loot state resources or to 'expropriate without compensation' to enrich themselves. Mandela and Tutu saw these decades ago. Although these concerns have a long history, Chris Hani's (Tandwa 2018) of 1992, in probably most profound:

> "What I fear is that the liberators emerge as elitists who drive around in Mercedes Benz's and use the resources of this country to live in palaces and to gather riches."

A leading exponent of the frontier tradition in South African historiography is Martin Chatfield Legassick (1940–2016). Legassick's PhD thesis in History was submitted at the University of California at Los Angles in 1969 with the title *The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780–1840: the Politics of a Frontier Zone* and published in 2010 in unabbreviated form as *The Politics of a South African Frontier. The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the Missionaries, 1780-1840*.

Legassick set out 'to provide a very detailed account of the formation of the Griqua politics in the frontier zone north of the Gariep' and how they attempted to 'impose their hegemony over the south-western Tswana' (Ross in Legassick 2010: xi-xii). According to Professor Ross, Legassick made (at least two) major theoretical claims about the nature of South African frontiers' (Ross in Legassick 2010: xviii). The first claim is that frontiers

> 'should be considered geographically as zones, rather than as lines, and consequently that the frontier in any given place was a process, not an event' (Ross in Legassick 2010: xviii) but as a process.

The second claim is that instead of considering the frontier situation in terms of *racial* prejudice and implicitly as segregationist and apartheid systems,

> 'the frontier was a zone of acculturation, in both directions and of various forms of partnership between those of European decent and those who were not' (Ross in Legassick 2010: xix).

By the time that Legassick wrote the conclusion of his thesis, the work represented a *class interpretation*, at least of land-ownership, that made a distinction between 'landless class' across colour lines in the history of frontiers of South Africa (Legassick 2010: 330). Based on a set of characteristics about a frontier zone (Legassick 2010: 3–10), Legassick (2010: 318) then concluded:

> 'A frontier zone […] is a region where different cultural traditions come in contact and interact under conditions where no political community is able to establish and unchallenged legitimacy of authority.'

Two years later, Legassick presented a paper at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS) at the University of London, entitled 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography' that was later published for the first time in *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (Marks and Atmore 1980: 44–79). Race interpretations of the frontier tradition made place for class interpretation. Legassick wrote: 'Racist attitudes became a racist ideology which justified the subordination and oppression of blacks' but the 'situation is rather more complex' (Legassick in Marks and Atmore 1980: 48). Instead, according to Legassick, 'Genovese is insisting here that one must study not race relations as such but class relations' (Legassick in Marks and Atmore 1980: 49). Similarly, Moore (2015: ix) wrote that 'Giovanni [Arrighi] helped [him] to see that world history is indispensable to our analysis of the present crisis.'

After Legassick presented this paper in the 1970–71 academic term at the ICS, he revised parts of his PhD thesis (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 243) under the title 'The Northern Frontier to 1820: The Emergence of the Griqua People'. This revision was published in a book that Elphick and Giliomee edited (1980: 243–290) as *The Shaping of South African Society 1652–1820*. This revised article is of importance because Legassick (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 251) wrote that the 'obsession in the historiography of South Africa with the analysis of society in the "racial" terms', should rather interpret 'social relationships of class' that would challenge the liberal school on many of its central tenets. He asked: 'were these [social relationships] not class relationships?' (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 245). For Legassick, a 'major alternative explanation (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 244) would give rise to new interpretations and much controversy of domination and exploitation (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 244; Wright 1977).

But why is Legassick's class interpretation of the frontier (Legassick 2010: 3–10) so important to an understanding of ANC-capitalism? Firstly, the frontier was interpreted not a static place but a 'moving frontier'; as a 'meeting point'; where processes of social change take place; where people have rights but where supremacy and subordination took place; and lastly, where distinctions can be made between for example trading frontiers, settler frontiers, missionary frontier, miners' frontiers, and finally investment frontiers.

In the second place, Moore's web of life also comprises frontiers, resulting in both Moore and Legassick's views to be used to explain ANC-capitalism at 'work'.

In order to conceptualize Moore's use of 'frontiers', one needs to understand what Moore wants to achieve. Professor Moore is involved in driving a world-wide conversation about *capitalism as world-ecology* – a term that he formulated as far back as 2003 (Moore 2015: 8, note 15). In doing so, Moore

> 'and others in the world-ecology conversation have argued for a dialectical perspective on humans in the web of life—humans make natures, and the web of life make us' (Moore 2017: 197).

What is at stake? Moore (2015: 27) formulates it as follows: '[a]n interpretation of global crisis appropriate to our times, and relevant to our era's movements of liberation.'

To do so, a new language is necessary, 'one that comprehends the irreducibly dialectical relation between human and extra-human natures in the web of life' (Moore 2015: 5). Human and extra-human natures are at best distinguishable but not separable from each other. This is because of the principle of double-internality in the web of life with an interpenetrable relationship between the two. Frontiers are just not 'out there somewhere' – they are human co-produced spaces. And considering that centres of accumulated capital are frontiers for looting, then frontiers are not necessarily hundreds or more miles away: they are right here, right under the noses of the citizenry who walk past them every day on their ways to work in the central business districts of our cities, municipalities, local banks, provincial offices, airports, and parliament.

According to Moore (2015: 63), '[w]hile all civilizations had frontiers of a sort, capitalism did something different.' Before the 16th century 'frontiers were more-or-less the outcome of the system' but thereafter, the rise of capitalism led to 'endless accumulation'. In this process humans leave footprints behind – something that needs to be reduced. But, if Moore's 'alternative begins not with humans, not with nature but with the *relations* that co-produce manifold configurations of humanity-in-nature, organisms and environment, life and land, water and air' (Moore 2015: 5), then 'fraud and corruption' also fits that description of being co-produced by humans: humans-in-corruption, and corruption-in-humans.

In a sense, this is particularly true of post-apartheid South Africa. In an *un*-enlightened society (Engelbrecht 2014) fraud and corruption impoverishes *all* citizens, so instead of reducing, or even better, eradicating fraud and corruption, it has increased to the extent that many observers and some political elite, even in the ANC, admits that the country is on a brink of failure. In other words, the human footprint of fraud and corruption was extended and led its imprints into and at the frontiers of SOEs. But the ignorance about such is for all to see. While all liberal historical interpretations before the end of the late-1960s used some sort of race interpretation, Legassick's newly developed class interpretation of frontier history, also did something different. Those differences stemmed from his PhD thesis and were discussed here above. Whereas Legassick claimed two new major theoretical perspectives Moore (2015: 63) identified two relations within frontiers: (a) the deployment of territorial power and geographical knowledge that was required for 'the commodity-orientated appropriation of unpaid work/energy', and (b) that the 'extension of capitalist power to new, uncommodified spaces' was 'essential to creating forms of Cheap Nature specific to capitalism'.

For the purposes here, it is important to note that Moore (2015: 87) also wrote about 'last frontiers' – being places that can no longer supply the material goods necessary to sustain the required manufacturing outcomes for capitalist production. As a consequence the capitalist then has to move on to new places of supply. Similarly, ANC-kleptocrats systematically move from one 'dot' to

another – from one centre of surplus capital to another, such as in the case of the VBS Mutual Bank 'heist'. For Moore (2015: 107) 'capitalism is a frontier *process*: endless accumulation and endless geographical appropriation are joined by the hip' (emphasis added). Once the 'ecological surplus' (Moore 2015: 107) has dried up and the process then extended to a different geography, the ANC-kleptocrats have moved on to a next new 'dot' – to a 'rich frontier' for new appropriation (Moore 2015: 115). In both instances, the 'frontier therefore always beckons' (Moore 2015: 115) and they need to be 'revived' (Moore 2015: 115) or they cannot survive. New frontiers for appropriation are developed with the help of new technologies (Moore 2015: 148) as 'commodity frontiers' (Moore 2015: 144). But a 'Golden Age of Capital' is not sustainable because 'capital-intensity in specific frontiers' (Moore 2015: 155) becomes exhausted resulting in slow growth (Moore 2015: 227) to the point where the collective capital as world-ecology finds itself in an epochal crisis.

There is a further reason why Moore's view that the atmosphere is becoming the dumping ground for greenhouse gasses as a 'waste frontier' (Moore 2015: 101), is relevant here. It seems useful to interpret the South African rural areas as 'wasted frontiers' of underdevelopment, where the ANC impoverishes and leaves the poorest-of-the-poor communities to their own devices, yet, perpetuating a 'politics of hope' for selfish electoral support.

4. The face and *mentalité* of ANC-capitalism

Against the above, the argument is that the history of the structure of ANC-capitalism and its bedfellow, namely corruption in South Africa, have both fundamentally changed towards being institutionalised in scope and systemic in depth. In so doing, the ANC has created a world-within-a-world (or a-state-within-a-state) (Engelbrecht 2018: 1–29), hence the concept the 'ANC two-state South African state'. It is a meta-state in relation to the real state.

Whilst it would be unrealistic to expect consensus about a historical classification of capital's development from being hunter-gathering, to agrarian, to mining and lastly, to different manufacturing stages in South Africa, the ideological political-economics of *ANC-capitalism* is today based on concepts such as 'radical economic transformation'; 'revolutionary economic transformation' or similar revolutionary rhetoric that runs parallel to sloganeering. Moore (2015: 113) however, wrote about 'cyclical movements (phases of capitalism)', and 'successive eras of capitalist development'. But the world-ecology debate advocates that we do not live in the Holocene (of 0,01 mya), Pleistocene (of 1,8 mya) (Maud in Lewis 2008: 3) or the Anthropocene or any other geological epoch (Crist in Moore 2016: 14–33) where any of the above would survive scrutiny, but in the *Capitalocene*, in other words the 'late-capital period' (Engelbrecht 2018b) that is 'premised on a fundamental disequilibrium in the (value) relation of capitalization and appropriation in the web of life' (Moore 2015: 60).

During the previous century, but in particular during the last three decades in South Africa, the scope and nature of the 'breakdown of strategies and relations' (Moore 2015: 1) that have underpinned surplus capital accumulation, can, according to Moore, therefore best be described as epochal in scope *and* nature. The ANC does not see it in any other way than short-term win/not-win outcomes of the 2019 general elections.

One such recent departure is from the traditional liberal-radical debate of the 1980s that Merle Lipton (1989: 3) summarized more than 30 years ago, as follows:

> 'If it is assumed that capitalists are a homogeneous group, and apartheid a fixed social system, then there are four possible relationships between capitalists and apartheid:
>
> (i) Capitalists do not want to apartheid and have the power to get rid of it;
>
> (ii) Capitalists do not want apartheid, but do not have the power to get rid of it;
>
> (iii) Capitalists want apartheid, and have the power to retain it;
>
> (iv) Capitalists want apartheid, but do not have the power to retain it.'

The historical reality is that capitalists are not a homogeneous group of people neither was apartheid practices seen and experienced as a fixed social system by many South Africans.

The departure from the above is that for the first time, deep-rooted and long-term systemic fraud and corruption at the core of the ANC's two-state South African state have developed fundamentally *away from apartheid-capitalism towards ANC-capitalism.* Moore (2016: xi*)* uses 'a the world-ecology of capital'. This means that ANC-capitalism is a *new South African variant of capitalism in the capital of world-ecology. This particularism of ANC-capitalism lies in the characteristics of an illegal national economy* that has become 'locally specific' (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 57) and widely accepted within government structures but fiercely resisted by the citizenry (Basson and du Toit 2017). Moore's thoughts about capitalism as a historical process *and* a project (Moore 2015: 2; Levy 2018), makes provision for 'specificities [that] emerge within world-historical patterns…' (Moore 2015: 12). It allows 'us to see new connections' (Moore 2015: 7). One such new connection that Moore's thinking allows for is that of *ANC-capital as South African-ecology* in the web of life, in the wider world-ecology of capitalism.

Former finance minister Pravin Gordhan has often asked and warned South Africans to 'connect the dots' – to see new connections – when he publically spoke out against systemic state and private sector corruption in the country. For purposes here, these 'dots' that Gordhan spoke of, are the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); municipal, provincial and national treasuries; the South African Reserve Bank; the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; commercial banks; the networks between them, and lastly, the 'movers and shakers' or agents in the world of ANC-capital.

These ‘movers and shakers’ were previously described as kleptocrats (Engelbrecht 2016; Engelbrecht 2018). They ‘man’ or ‘staff’ the networks or ‘linkedin’s’ between the ‘dots’ or centres of surplus capital accumulation. In traditional Marxist language, the social scum in society was regarded as the ‘dangerous class’. Today it appears to be those behind state capture in South Africa to be the ‘dangerous class’. Unlike in traditional Marxist literature, it does not refer to the lumpenproletariat, but the ANC’s *neo*-bourgeoisie. This ‘dangerous class’ literally move from one ‘dot’ to another e.g. from one *centre of surplus accumulated capital* to another and has in the process systematically assisted in, or managed in, colonising (Engelbrecht 2016; Engelbrecht 2018b) all these centres of accumulated and accumulating monopoly capital – the real ‘frontiers of appropriation of sufficiently great mass’ (Moore 2015: 115) – with the purpose to illegally enrich themselves. On 20 October 2018, new finance minister Tito Mboweni spoke at the second annual Kader Asmal Memorial Lecture at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology’s Mowbray Campus in Cape Town, only days before his mini budget address and said:

> ‘That’s what we found happened in the past nine years, this great public sector heist in the form of State Capture. It’s a heist. It’s robbery. Daylight robbery’ (Omarjee 2018).

Mboweni’s comments are probably the most profound thus far on state capture in the sense that he referred to the entire public service, no longer to just the SOEs.

But how did this come about? Surely, it is more complicated than a band of crooks arriving at their preferred place to loot, shouting: “Your Money Or Your Life!”, and everybody ducked behind the saloon counter? Marx explained how the capitalist regimes in Western Europe either

> ‘directly conquered the whole domain of national production’ or ‘indirectly controls those strata of society which, through belonging to the antiquated mode of production, continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay’ (Marx 1983).

The early revelations and understanding that is still developing about state capture in South Africa is not dissimilar from Marx’s views: the ANC two-state state controls vast portions of the production and supply chain processes in South Africa – at least through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action or ‘processes of transformation’. For some, BEE has been described as a ‘process that provides enhanced opportunities of black individuals (rather than groups) to improve their position via affirmative action’ and for others it is a ‘process of seeking the formation of a black capitalist class’ (Ponte *et al.* 2007: 1–2). Its direct and indirect controls and influences over centres of

accumulated monopoly capital are undisputed. ANC-capitalism associates closely with officials in those institutions to the point that they both experience and or contribute to mutual gradual decay – in financial, ethical and moral terms.

If one applies Moore's reasoning and expands Marx's concepts of 'modern theory of colonialism' and 'systematic colonialism' (Marx 1983: 716–724), and agree that the ANC has systematically but purposefully colonised the centres of accumulated monopoly capital and have broken down, at least since 1994, 'the strategies and relations that have sustained capital accumulation' (Moore 2015: 1) in the country to achieve selfish ANC-capitalist objectives of expropriating surplus capital accumulation without compensation, then, simply put, the country is in effect looted (Cronin 2012: 1–13) after it went through a process of internal colonization. In this regard, Marx wrote:

> 'the capitalist regime has either directly conquered the whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less developed, it, at least, indirectly controls those strata of society which, through belonging to the antiquated mode of production, continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay' […] It is otherwise in the colonies. There the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead of the capitalist' (Marx 1983: 716).

In a sense, the ANC kleptocrats combined both. Firstly, ANC-capitalism colonized the 'whole domain of production' – meaning the centres of capital accumulation in the 'frontiers of accumulation' – through their own historical process of internal colonization. They therefore directly control that strata of corruptible officialdom in society that help them loot state assets. Because of the principle of capital as social relations (Moore) that over time became corrupt social relations, the ANC and kleptocratic officialdom existed and continue to exist side by side in a downward spiral, gradually decaying relationship, where the strategies and relations that have sustained capital accumulation over (Moore 2015: 1) decades, have broken down. For our purposes here, peak frontier appropriation, or geographical appropriation, according to Moore (2015: 107), ANC-capitalism as a world-ecology and a frontier process, 'are joined at the hip' through endless kleptocratic accumulation.

But peak appropriation in world-ecology understanding, has an important difference to simplistic views of the 'peak everything' debate (Moore 2015: 106). It is not a question of *substances* that are depleted (and of course they are) but it is a question of *relations*. In a normal-functioning state where strategies and relations have not broken down (but in the ANC's two-state capitalist state where strategies and relations of normalcy have purposefully been destroyed), the 'peek "gap" between the capital set in motion to produce a given commodity and work/energy embodied in the commodity', is seen as peak appropriation.

Translated into ANC-capitalism and frontiers as co-produced spaces of accumulation, means that ANC-capitalists co-produced the frontiers and institutions for plunder. ANC-capitalist relations move through the *oikeios* in bundles (fraud and corruption are two such bundles) in the web of life to and through monopoly frontiers where plundering of the centres of accumulated monopoly capital are at 'work'. The implication is that the capital invested or necessary to plunder, is very little since the state pays for it *but* the 'energy returned on capital invested' (EROCI) (Moore 2015: 106), is huge. This means that the capital invested is insignificant in relation to the 'energy returned' or rather efforts made (energy or work) to 'bring home the loot'.

Secondly, whereas for Marx things are different in the colonies, for the purposes here, things are also different in the outlying geographical areas – the periphery. Having completed their process of internal colonialism that extends into the periphery, the kleptocrats have to face the rural communities that are mainly less educated and in many instances employed in the subsistence agriculture economy. Here the new elite bourgeoisie elite come into conflict with those rural producers, working class and generally lowly paid petty producers who struggle to make a life for themselves.

Inadvertently, the ANC-capitalism as world-ecology has, combined both the above as its own decayed capital social relations. Of course it spills over into the judicial and political domains. How does that happen?

A further observation is that capitalism has been turned on its head. Many years ago Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Desmond Tutu and Jeremy Cronin, although for different purposes, spoke out against black *neo*-bourgeoisie and their self-enrichment. One reference to Mandela would suffice. Butcher (2001) reported:

> 'In an extraordinary attack on the country's black leaders yesterday, he [Mandela] said the party's reputation had been tarnished by a series of financial scandals and abuses of power. Mr Mandela said: "Little did we suspect that our own people, when they got a chance, would be as corrupt as the apartheid regime. That is one of the things that has really hurt us."'

But Mbeki 'at his core was a revolutionary idealist' (Gevisser 2007: xxix). He did not seem

> 'able to bridge the distance that existed between his fantasy of leading South Africa to freedom […] and the reality of actually being there […] at the end point of everything he has ever planned for, full of patterns for redemption but without the necessary power, really, to implement them' (Gevisser 2007: xxix).

As a result, Mbeki was ineffective against rooting out corruption (Gevisser 2007: xxxviii–xxxix) and in fact, the Arms Deal narrative suggests even worse.

In early October 2011, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, said in Cape Town at a news briefing on the government's failure to grant the Dalai Lama a visa, the following:

> 'South Africans will pray for the downfall of the ANC like they did with the apartheid government. [...] "Hey Mr Zuma, you and your government don't represent me. You represent your own interests"' (*news24 archives* 2011).

Zuma, on the other hand, known for his closeness to corruption, has the unenviable court finding for his corrupt relationship with his former financial advisor, Schabir Shaik (Basson 2012: 8). But still, Zuma enjoys and continues saying the right things. For example:

> 'In his first state of the nation speech, Zuma committed himself and his administration to the fight against corruption in the public service. "We will pay particular attention to combatting corruption and fraud in procurement and tender processes, application for drivers' licences, social grants, IDs, and theft of the police docket,' he said"' (Basson 2012: 20).

Thirty years ago Alf Stadler (1989: 165) discussed the progress of three phases of 'reform from above' and stated: 'The debate [at that time] seriously threatened the authority of the National Party among its supporters.' Currently, the ANC is threatened by a worse problem – it is threatened by the debate about its continued *legitimacy.* Whilst corrupt leaders and party functionaries might arguably still have the institutionalized *authority* to govern, they certainly have none such based on *illegitimacy*. Consequently, the party is on trial and should be dealt with by the judicial system.

Moore (2015: 5) questioned the traditional Cartesian narrative relating to capitalism, and summarised it in the following manner:

> 'Capitalism—or if one prefers, modernity or industrial civilization—emerged *out* of Nature. It drew wealth *from* Nature. […] It disrupted, degraded, or defiled *Nature*. And now, or sometime very soon, Nature will exact its revenge. Catastrophe is coming. Collapse is on the horizon.'

As a result, the proponents of the word 'Capitalocene' in particular Moore (2015, 2016), argue that the origins of capitalism date back to *c.*1450s, and not to the recent Industrial Revolution of the mid-19th century during which steam and coal were regarded as the primary drivers of industrialization, or,

in the South African case, certainly not since the advent of the mining era of the 1870s (Visser in Pretorius 2014: 478).

This perspective therefore also questions Friedrich Engels (2005: 50) when he wrote that '[t]he history of the proletariat in England begins with the second half of the last century, with the invention of the steam-engine and of machinery for working cotton'. The word 'Capitalocene', and not the word 'Anthropocene', also advocates *that capital is not an economic system, also not a social system*, but instead *'a way of organising nature'* (Moore 2015: 2). If capital is a way of organizing nature, then 'capitalism is a *project*', one that creates according to Moore, e.g. empires or sciences in the web of life (Moore 2015: 2). Lastly, because 'a way of organising nature' happens also through humans, they too are regarded as both co-producers and products in the life-cycle of the web of life. In short, this is why Moore (2015: 3) suggests that a 'new paradigm' of 'capitalism as a world-ecology, joining the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the co-production of nature, in a dialectical unity', breaks with traditional Cartesian beliefs.

This new dialectical unity side-lines traditional thinking about the separation of Nature from Society (Moore 2015: 1–30). Unlike the attention given to the primacy of the political in early Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, Moore developed the primacy of *capital as world-ecology*. Today the implication is that it is no longer a matter of a crisis of capitalism + nature, but instead, it is a crisis of 'modernity-*in*-nature' (Moore 2015: 4). So: traditional wisdom is replaced, not fixed, adjusted or transformed. Ruth First[1] for instance, held 'that the white power state, rooted in the cardinal doctrine of apartheid is itself so gravely and irreparably wrong that there is no way to change it but by destroying it' (First in Mandela 1980: v).

In ANC-capitalist rhetoric terms this suggests that:

white monopoly capital = black poverty; whilst colonial exploitation = white privilege.

Such eclipse of ANC-reason, can, of course not be upheld. Even if the above is correct, the ANC remains loath to answer the following question: To what then, does black monopoly capital and black privilege, respectively, equate to? But unfortunately for the ANC, the fortunate truth is that *all* races in South Africa can boast monopoly capital. In fact, on Friday night addressing the inaugural SA Investment Summit dinner, Ramaphosa said:

> "We have become accustomed to … treating our entrepreneurs and businesspeople [badly] and called them all sorts of names. We've treated them like enemies…white monopoly capital – that must end today" (Correspondent 2018).

[1] South African socialist, anti-apartheid activist and scholar. Fled South Africa in 1963 after 117 days in solitary confinement in South African jails and killed on 17 August 1982 by a parcel bomb in Maputo, Mozambique.

The implication is that when it suits the government to talk about radical economic transformation, revolutionary economic transformation or WMC in terms that are offensive to many South Africans, it seems to be inconsequential, but when it needs WMC regardless of how beneficial it is to only some South Africans, then such exclusiveness is not an issue

But for Moore (2015: 3), the term 'modernity' is 'an organic whole'. Seen in this way, we do not live in compartmentalized pigeonholes but in the *oikeio*s which Moore defined as 'the creative, generative, and multi-layered relation of species and environment' (Moore 2015: 4). At best, Nature and Society are distinguishable but not separable.

Moore (2015: 5) also offers the following helpful concept of 'double internality' for the arguments herein, as follows:

> 'An alternative begins neither with "humans" nor with "nature" but with the *relations* that co-produce manifold configuration of humanity-in-nature, organisms and environments, life and land, water and air. "History", in this sense, is the history of a "double internality": humanity-in-nature/nature-in-humanity. […] In this double internality, everything that humans do is *already* joined with extra-human nature *and* the web of life: nature as a whole that includes humans.'

The influence of humans on nature makes humans a natural force. This is in line with the concept of double-internality (Moore 2015: 7): 'species make environments, and environments make species'. If then, it is correct that 'humanity is a species-environment relation' (Moore 2015: 11), then Moore's 'double-internality' enables the construction of an analysis put forward of 'capitalism's internalization of planetary life' and the 'biosphere's internalization of capital' (Moore 2015: 13). This, according to Moore (2015: 13–14), makes capitalism not 'a narrow set of economic or social relations' but rather a world-ecology of 'capital, power, and re/production in the web of life'. Therefore: 'Instead of hiving off capitalism into something "economic" and then looking at all the terrible things that capitalism or industrial society has done…' (Moore 2017: 2), the

> '[c]apitalocene argument says that capitalism is a way of organising the relations between humans and the rest of nature—that it is a system of nature, capital and power. We have to understand that most of the things that happen in the capitalist era are not done by capitalists: they are done by states, and they are enabled by culture of domination, especially racism and sexism' (Moore 2017: 2).

Of course, no-one would argue that states, racism and sexism just appear from nowhere – *they are all human creations*. In the context of this article, the contention is that the ANC-capitalist two-state state, creates the *oikeios* after its own image and dominates the web of like fraudulently. This has huge long-term implications for the state, the citizens and frontiers of accumulated monopoly capital.

In the early 1950s, Nelson Mandela (1953: 21) wrote:

> 'Since 1912 and year after year thereafter, in their homes, in provincial and national gatherings, on trains and buses, in the factories and on the farms, in cities, villages, shanty-towns, schools and prisons, the African people have discussed the shameful misdeeds of those who rule the country.'

Today one can say the same (except for adding social media and television): that from post-Mandela, the above is also true.

In terms of the history of ANC's anti-intellectual rhetoric, civic inequalities are simply a *mentalité* that can be rectified by virtue of *neo*-relations between state and centres of accumulated monopoly capital. Such relations can be with domestic and/or international centres of accumulated monopoly capital as long as the entitlement *mentalité* and demand of a 'time to eat' are simultaneously sufficient and necessary grounds for looting state resources. Corruption is, after all, according to Zuma, 'a white man's thing'. Strangely, Zuma might have a point because '[c]orruption in South Africa predates apartheid' (Bruce 2014: 56). To that end, the SOE's, or in a broader sense of the word, centres of accumulated white monopoly capital, were repurposed as 'a way to organize nature' into *an illegal core-state economy within the traditional or mainstream periphery-economy*, and well within the reach 'and structured to be looted' (Cronin 2012: 1–13).

More than a decade ago, Gevisser (2007: xxx) wrote that 'liberation movements are driven by dreams, and the ANC has been no different'. He continued:

> 'Like an increasing number of South Africans, I have wearied over time of the government's tendency to blame all problems on the legacy of apartheid (or the ''counter-revolutionary'' agendas of the media), but I began to realise now, for the first time, how profoundly disempowering it must be if you – the moral victor of the struggle against apartheid – have to blame your shortcomings perpetually on the illicit regime you thought you had conquered' (Gevisser 2007: xxx).

This embarrassment must be worse for the ruling elite having to go back to colonialist countries with its WMC asking for foreign capital investment because ANC-capitalist government cannot balance the country's books. Probably more embarrassing is what most would say Oliver Tambo did not

foresee. In 1964 Tambo (Tambo in Mandela 1980: x) wrote: 'Apartheid stirs hatred and frustration among people' – for our purposes here, today the same can be said of state capture. Most early-21st century economic organisations are sophisticated ecologies in the web of life in which they operate. Minimalist interpretations or views of socio-economic structures that denies the complexity of their functioning, fails to understand the 'modernist'

> 'deeper divergence [that] emerged between a class of producers and merchants with access to gold, and a class, mainly formed of the mass of dependent or landless labourers, deprived of "equal access" to mainstream coinage' (Tedesco 2018: 115–116).

It is *not land or rent but rather monetary wealth* that are the prime movers of 'ANC-capitalist means of production'. ANC-capitalist means of production are those energies expensed (or 'invested') in *all* forms of state capture to secure (deliver) monetary wealth. In other words there is no trading in the traditional sense of the word that takes place: instead, monetary wealth is derived from 'profit of alienation' (Tedesco 2018: 118). Corrupt and corruptible comrades were 'alienated' from their good human nature that all people are equally born into. Through corruption, fraud and looting, almost immediately a new class of capitalists emerged. This *praxis* introduced a misleading variable into the establishment of new relations of production, namely the indebtedness to payback for anti-apartheid struggle-efforts. In this way a new 'acquisitive elite' (Tedesco 2018: 118) supports the ANC-capitalists 'that cannot by itself cause the overthrow of consolidated conditions of production' (Tedesco 2018: 119). In this manner the ANC controls both the state (means of production) and handpicked *handlangers* from the ruling class.

But the ANC *cannot* and Zuma *could not* be trusted even *with its own ANC-capitalist factional economy*. Their own party members admit this. Three examples will support this claim. According to Basson and Du Toit (2017: xii):

> 'The endemic and systemic corruption has reached such levels under Zuma's presidency that loyal ANC cadres, who had given up the largest part of their adult lives for the liberation struggle, now say that only way for the country to be saved is for the ANC to be voted out of power in 2019.'

At the time when the then president Zuma fired finance minister Pravin Gordhan on 30 March 2017, Zuma showed publically in front of television cameras, an intelligence report that claims sinister intentions behind Gordhan's planned meetings with prominent American and British bankers (Letsoalo 2017). The authenticity of these 'spy files' were never verified and therefore widely discredited during the Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture. Critics and civil society

dismissed the document as neither 'intelligent' nor resembling any remnants of a 'report'. This is important in the context that neither the party nor Zuma can be trusted with state resources. More importantly is that they cannot be trusted with the *truth*. Instead, state resources and the truth were both colonized for self-gain.

Without elaborating, two examples will suffice. In the first example,

> 'South Africa's High Court ruled that Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba lied under oath when he testified during his tenure as home affairs minister in a case filed by a company that wanted to open a private immigration terminal at the country's biggest airport.
>
> "The minister deliberately told untruths under oath," Judge Neil Tuchten said in his ruling, which was circulated by the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, on Wednesday shortly before Gigaba was due to deliver the annual budget. "The minister has committed a breach of the Constitution so serious that I could characterize it as a violation' (Viechiatto 2018).

In the second example,

> 'there was evidence "very strongly" suggesting that some of Minister Dlamini's evidence under oath in the affidavits submitted to the Constitutional Court was false' Viechiatto 2018).

During March and April 2016, (the former) Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, received three complaints

> 'by Father S. Mayebe on behalf of the Dominican Order, a group of Catholic Priests, on 18 March 2016 […]; Mr. Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the Democratic Alliance and Leader of the Opposition in Parliament on 18 March 2016 [...], in terms of section 4 of the Executive Members' Ethics Act, 82 of 1998 (EMEA); and a member of the public on 22 April 2016' (Madonsela 2016: 29).

These complaints all relate to alleged improper and unethical conduct concerning appointments of cabinet ministers, directors and awarding of state contracts and other benefits to the Gupta family's business (Madonsela 2016: 4). They specifically reference improper and unethical conduct of former president Zuma (Madonsela 2016: 9). But Zuma claimed that he was never given an opportunity to

put his side of the story to Madonsela during her state capture investigations, when in fact on 6 October 2016 Madonsela interviewed Zuma in the presence of his lawyer. A transcript of this meeting was part of her report (Madonsela 2016: 42) is in the public domain, and for everyone to listen to.

South African society at large has been calling for and demonstrated widely in 2016 and 2017, for Zuma to do the honourable thing and resign from office. This is public fact: the #ZumaMustFall-campaign that culminated in 2016 cannot be wished away. Thousands of placards during dozens of public protest marches across the county at the time cannot be deleted from lived memory, real life experiences or denied.

One manner to explain this radical shift in South African politics and society is to understand how ANC *praxes* have been practicing its own form of systematic internal colonialism and how close it has always been to, and continue to thrive on, monopoly capital and the centres thereof. This keeps the ANC as a proponent, accumulator and distributor of monopoly capital amongst *haute* ANC elite, spearheaded by Zuma and surrounded by kleptocrats.

It is not surprising that the accumulation of capital and the 'struggle for ascendency within the ANC' (Kasrils 2017: 9) are closely related (Britain in Kasrils 2017: ix; Bruce 2014: 49–62). Although in a different context, former national director of public prosecutions Pikoli remembered that '[t]his is not free, fair or democratic' (Pikoli and Wiener 2013) because '[w]e were prepared to die for our liberation' – but 'today not many are prepared to resign for the future of the country or in the name of ethical politics (Van Onselen 2012).

The theoretical model for analysis herein is in part based on the truism that social sciences often tend to

> 're-examine their philosophical foundation […] during periods of crises: periods when familiar and trusted methods no longer seem to justify the faith originally invested in them, when researchers lose confidence in the significance of their finding, and when obvious and taken-for-granted principles no longer see quite so clear cut' (Hughes 1987: 1).

One such new interpretation of the influence of the state on society is the ANC's colonialism *praxis* that has culminated in 2016 in what is today widely known and accepted as 'state capture'. The historiography of this process is still only in its infancy (Engelbrecht 2018b).

Marx's 'modern theory of colonisation' (Marx 1985: 716–724) has practical intent for this article – its 'abstract stance' has been reduced (Engelbrecht 2012: 1) and has been decontextualized for our purposes herein and applied in a version different 'from the context in which it was originally embedded' (Adorno 2009: xiv). The contention is that the ANC's political-economics – meaning ANC-capitalism since 1994, is closely associated with its own *praxis* of colonialism and colonising strategies of the South African society and state organs. This can best be described as the ANC's

unique form of capitalist world-making of the South African everyday web of life, claiming to achieve a better life for all South Africans but for the poorest-of-the-poor in particular.

It is currently accepted in anti-ANC narrative, that the ANC conducts its governance in anti-workers' interest, or stated differently, in pro-capital spirit. This is reflected in its practices of scarce resources illegally acquired, for self-interest. Workers are exploited – not only in monetary terms – but also in political terms as voting pawns by virtue of all the promises made and pretentions put forward by an organization that claims to be the champion for the workers' movement. The ANC is incapable of keeping its end of the bargain of a Social Contract with society. In fact, it has never entered into such contract. Basson and Du Toit (2017: xii) termed this 'a false narrative that he [Zuma] and his supporters created'. The strategic considerations of a false narrative are experienced in real lived spaces where the advancement of places for the accumulation of capital were purposefully identified and developed. In this way the ANC's unofficial and systematic colonisation seeks to expand the ANC-way of doing things (*ANC praxis*) in society. It professes to be campaigning for *all* South Africans but in reality it means that is does so for the ANC ruling élite.

The century-old ANC promise of 'for-all-South-Africans' never trickled down to the ordinary everyday citizen as it was sold to the electorate that it would. This is ironic when in the mid-1960s Oliver Tambo (Tambo in Mandela 1980: xi) wrote: 'The Government did not listen and soon enough the tear gas and the muzzles of guns were soon turned against the people'. The same ANC has to date not answered on the Marikana killing and subsequent police killings or use of tear gas in numerous service delivery protests in the country as widely reported. The mass demonstrations against non-service delivery by government for more than two decades now, testify to this (Mc Lennan and Munslow 2009). In fact, when demonstrators are interviewed, they clearly explain that lack or no service delivery is at the core of their protests. ANC unofficial and systematic colonisation is characterised by continued spatial separation between the colonising ANC power élite and the gap they created between themselves and the colonised working class. In general, 'in all instances some form of exploitation' (Engelbrecht 2012: 3) of the citizens, are at the centre of ANC-capitalism. Through the primacy of politics, 'coercive or extra-economic' (Webster in Webster 1986: 1) exploitation, sucked many kleptocrats into what Moore (2015) termed 'Cheap Labour' as a process of *neo*-proletarianization.

More than two years ago, Mashele and Qobo (2016: 1) wrote:

> 'For three and a half centuries, the native people of South Africa had languished under the yoke of racism by successive white minority regimes. This was part of a larger European project which placed all human being on Earth under the political and economic control of the Occident'.

This seems an incorrect simplification. Black racism appears to have found renewed traction *alongside* white racism. These authors also failed to provide detail or even an acceptable rough outline of such grand project as if it was a coherent, agreed undertaking to place all humanity under the controls of a mother-country. However, Ngwena was quick to criticize Zille, as Mashele and Qobo mentioned. They reduce colonialism simplistically to 'a money-making affair' (Mashele and Qobo 2016: 2) of non-white exploitation. This simplistic interpretation is in line with views that equate capitalist imperialism through to colonialism, we are lead to believe, as apparently perpetrated by white male Europeans, only. The 'formation of the ANC as a response to a long history of colonialism and apartheid' (Mashele and Qobo 2016: 4) is in essence 'a struggle against colonialism [that] represented the yearning of Africans to be free' (Mashele and Qobo 2016: 131). Yet, the contradiction of 'Freedom Now, Education Tomorrow' (Pikoli and Wiener 2013: 47), has become a daily reality and a desire for 'freedom now' and 'education later' are not mutually exclusive. The real 'benefits' of such deferring tactics are today a sad reality of what was supposed to be a 'gains' benefit. Widespread service delivery protests from essentially black communities, testifies to this.

When Helen Zille tweeted her remarks on colonialism in March 2017, Ngwena was loath to also apply concepts such as 'self-serving' and 'regimes of truth' (Ngwena 2017) to kleptocratic ANC utterances. Whilst it is true that colonialism has contributed to the creation of race tensions and the perpetuation of its legacies at the expense of the majority of South Africans (and elsewhere in the world), it is equally true that the ANC is using the very same criticisms of colonialism to advance its own agenda of intended conquest and hegemonic domination of civic and institutional contemporary South African society.

Speaking in her capacity as the chairperson of the ANC's international relations subcommittee, Molewa said that the ANC has fraternal ties with the Polisarion Front and recognises the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. The organisation regards the matter of Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara as a form of colonialism and remains outspoken in its opposition to the continued occupation (Khoza 2017).

Social media conversations show clearly and quickly how many South Africans are in agreement that the economy has gone backwards under ANC rule. Many black people view the economy as being run by 'Indian foreigners', derogatory referring to the Gupta's. Even public views for example about Cosatu wanting to buy chicken farms or wanting to have a stake in a Chevrolet automotive plant, are apparently ways of decolonisation. Black peoples' responses in social media show their belief that the ANC has gained nothing but instead has sold-out black pride because black citizens argue that they find themselves under worse colonialists – being ANC colonialists.

Yet, former minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, said in her speech in Jakarta how 'collaboration between Asia and Africa was also intended to overcome the forces of colonialism which are still strong, though on the verge of retreat' (Fabricius 2015). Clearly, in the context of this article, this is an example of 'old language'. Although, according to her,

colonialism had since been defeated, the "struggle for a better world is far from over, and this is what makes our gathering so significant. Institutions of global governance remain unchanged. Neo-colonialism is staring us in the eyes. Poverty and inequality are a reality all over the world. Asia generally went on to prosper after colonialism while Africa, generally, descended into an extended abyss of conflict and chaos. The minister's remarks about neo-colonialism still "staring us in the eyes" may offer a clue to the reason for these divergent paths. The Asian countries generally resolved to look pragmatically to their futures and to leave their histories of colonial suffering in the history books.

Most Indians seem to have no issue any longer with their former colonial master, Britain, and are even inclined to appreciate its legacy of governance and infrastructure. Many African countries chose instead to dwell on the past and the continuing manifestations of the past in the present, as an explanation, often an excuse, for their own, many failures. To be fair, it is probably true that the former colonial powers did indeed maintain a greater presence in Africa than they did in Asia, generally speaking. But, Mondi Makhanya (2018) wrote in this regard:

> 'But one of the biggest culprits in our fight against racism and racial division is the ANC, the governing part of this divided republic. […] And if the administration of the past decade had not been as dirty and plunderous as it was, the racists in our midst would not be as bold as they are.'

On 27 May 2017, Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba, gave an economic policy lecture organised by the ANC Youth League's eThekwine region in Pinetown (KwaZulu-Natal) promoting the theme that the South African economy, after 25 years of ANC rule, is still built on foundations of oppression and colonial relations (Erasmus 2017). Even if this is true, equally important is the question posed by society: Why has so little been done by the ANC government to have rectified these 'historical imbalances of the past'?

Societal creeping of the party, and its ANC-capitalism, falls into the category of Marx's 'systematic colonisation', but with a noticeable difference: it became *systemic in scope* and *corrupt in nature.* 'Systematic colonisation' is *a practice* when the state (mother country) artificially creates manufacturing capitalists – entrepreneurs – in ANC language, to create jobs. But in the context of this article, '[m]anufacturing capitalists' must not here be seen in the narrow 'producing' sense of the word as if it refers to a manufacturing system of 'making' e.g. clothes, mobile phones or cars. 'Systematic colonisation' *is* also *a tool* through state projects, to realize its objectives, e.g. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), National Development Plan (NDP), Radical Economic Transformation (RET), or New Dawn, to advance capitalism – through policies, procedures, laws, or an ideology, etc. 'Systematic

capitalism' *is a strategy* for a plan for action. Lastly, 'systematic colonisation' *is an end state*, e.g. of having achieved self-enrichment, the attainment of an élite position in a network of power.

At the centre of systematic colonisation is a process of dispossession, either directly or indirectly. Systematic colonisation is not to be distorted to be restricted to geo-political spaces as was the case in traditional theory. It should instead, be seen as a comprehensive society-wide capitalist ideological black elitist strategy for domination. Systematic colonisation shows deliberate societal creeping for infiltrating society. 'This omnipresence of ''societal creeping'' spreads from one individual to and other, from one collective workplace to others from lower to higher organisational levels and finally, from one colony to another' (Engelbrecht 2012: 4).

In 1969, South African historian C.F.J. Muller's

> 'emphasis on financial and economic factors, imperialism and the protection of the interests of the British empire, as well as philanthropic factors, were generally accepted as sufficient explanatory variables of the relationship between British colonial policy and e.g. the Great Trek' (Engelbrecht 2012: 1).

A matrix (Engelbrecht 2013: 14) that combined these factors with Marx's four contexts of systematic colonisation, can now be developed to serve as an analytical framework for the explanation of the ANC's contexts of systematic colonisation and its affinity for monopoly capital.

Conclusion

In studying the history of capitalism, '*ideas matter*' (Moore 2015: 195). This holds true for this investigation into ANC-capitalism and a number have been put on display. Most stem from Moore's thinking in relation to *capitalism as world-ecology*.

For a second time in the history of South Africa, the ruling political elite have turned on the majority of its own people by conducting governing *praxes* that most citizens do not want: the National Party gave apartheid, and ANC-capitalism instituted systemic state capture through internal colonisation and corruption. There is a further contradiction: early '[w]hite farmers' first priority was not partition, but black labour' (Giliomee 2016: ix); early ANC ruling elite's first priority was not societal integration, but monopoly capital. In addition, if white European capitalist colonialism brought about nothing 'good', then the same is the case for black internal colonialism by ANC-capitalism in the web of life.

It is not that capitalism as world-ecology should be fixed, transformed, or even better, replaced, but it is the *people with exploitive and endless illegal accumulation praxes* that include their social relations, who should be removed from the system. They use the ever-present devaluation

characteristic of capital as world-ecology to force capital forward towards 'enclosures of new values' […] 'as capital compulsively seeks to reproduce itself on an expansive scale' (Knuth *et al*. 2018: 1).

The breakdown of the strategic moral structural relationships between ANC-capitalism and all forms of social relations are exposed in different permutations – to use Moore's (2015: 105–108) terminology, through 'peak appropriation'. Moore's concept of *'peak appropriation' can be well employed to describe ANC-corruption as the highest understanding of the materialist conception of struggle history.*

The ANC-capitalist kleptocrats do not see fraud and corruption as pathologies of the social kind but merely view life as structure-functional one-dimensional entities of modern society that can be looted. Moore (2015: 124, 139) sometimes used the term 'plunder'. This unenlightened perspective of life stems from the neo-idealist misunderstanding of the seamless relationship between the party and its leader who loot or protect the looting process through systematically syphoning state assets. Such rational blind-spot restricts the ANC elite's ability to reveal the wider moral struggles that make up every-day social struggles since its own ruling elite's internal colonisation of its own two-state state (Calvert 2011: 51). Through driving policies of Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment, the interests of political and bureaucratic elite are linked to the powerful and wealthy because of their connections and capabilities (Lee and Mondi 2018: 1). In this process of looting, the principle of 'Cheap inputs' (Moore 2015: 117) reign supreme, because its costs the capitalist kleptocrats nothing. Moore provides an important theme against which this can be referenced. He wrote and asked two questions, one is of interest here: '…how is human history a *co-produced* history, through which humans have put nature to work—including other humans—in accumulating wealth and power' (Moore 2015: 9. Emphasis in original.)

The persistent 'ANC's disrespect for voters through its continued deployment of cadre deployments', gatekeeping, and their continued perpetuation of 'the myth of the "celebration" of 20 years of democracy' (Sooliman 2014: 2, 4), underline that millions of pages have been, and more will be filled with critiquing e.g. capitalism. But any -ism in the hands of the 'dangerous class', will make the -ism turn bad. Therefore, should one not start with the root problem? Because by themselves, -isms did not turn bad overnight – instead, it is humans as co-producers of the web of life how are responsible and accountable.

A strong case was previously made that *the ANC cannot operate without or with capital*: its involvement in the VBS 'heist' is clear and exposed. The converged triangular crises between the ANC, the SACP and EFF in the VBS heist, make the ANC's confederation of 'alliance partners' its outsourced political labor brokers. The ANC is on trial because it cannot be trusted. Similarly, *fraud and corruption has previously been described as crimes against the South African humanity and should be treated as such by the international judiciary.*

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Why? Because enlightened human freedom also depends on the removal of humankind's mastery to master over the double-internality principle: mastery over humanity-in-nature and over nature-in-humanity in the web of life.

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